Security audit

FridayNext

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This looks like a real FridayNext iOS/OpenClaw bridge, but installing it automatically expands gateway exposure and agent/tool authority enough that users should review it first.

Install only if you intentionally want FridayNext to act as a mobile control surface for your OpenClaw gateway. Review the automatic config changes, especially LAN binding, tool allow-list changes, conversation access, phone permissions for Health/Calendar/Reminders/location, and FridayTunnel/public-access standby. Keep the gateway token private and disable the plugin or FridayTunnel settings if you do not want remote/mobile administration.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The instruction 'When the user asks for anything time-related' is extremely broad and overlaps with common everyday requests. It does not clearly constrain when this skill should activate versus when other skills or normal conversation handling should apply.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

Confidence: 77% confidence
Finding: The document introduces Chinese-language phrasing and examples alongside English ones, but does not state whether the skill should mirror the user's language or ask for preference. This can create an implicit language behavior without explicit user choice.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.env_credential_access

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: dist/src/public-access/frpc-manager.js:771
Evidence: return execFileSync("powershell", [

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: install-runtime.js:55
Evidence: exec(

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: install.js:59
Evidence: execSync(`${cmd} --version`, { stdio: "ignore" });

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: dist/src/npm-registry.js:64
Evidence: const override = process.env[REGISTRY_ENV_VAR];

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: install.js:16
Evidence: const sudoUser = process.env.SUDO_USER;