Security audit

Linear

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Linear integration clearly discloses its account access, credential storage, and data sharing, and requires user intent before changing records.

Review the Linear permissions you grant and the records being changed, especially for batches. Keep unrelated secrets out of tool arguments and revoke access when no longer needed. Rerun setup only with fresh OAuth credentials because it overwrites the stored credentials.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (3)

Credential Access

High

Category: Privilege Escalation
Confidence: 70% confidence
Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.
md
- `MAVERICK_LINEAR_MCP_EXPIRES_IN` - `MAVERICK_LINEAR_MCP_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES_AT` These expiry fields are vault metadata, not tool arguments. They let mcporter make better pre-request refresh decisions for the access token and preserve refresh-token expiry information when the upstream OAuth response includes it. **Setup-time prerequisites.** Setup needs `bash`, `jq`, and `mcporter` (>= v0.11.0) on `PATH`. These are gated by the install caller, not by `requires.bins` in this file, which gates agent-runtime eligibility. If setup fails, verify those binaries are present and current before retrying.

Unrestricted Tool Access

Medium

Category: Excessive Agency
Confidence: 80% confidence
Finding: Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.
The output includes Linear's Instructions: field (read it - it specifies, for example, how to format markdown content) and a JSON Schema for every tool's parameters. Treat this as the authoritative reference for the rest of the session.

Step 2 - Call any tool from the catalog using the form <server>.<tool> where <server> is maverick-linear (the local registration key, not the published skill name):

sh
mcporter --config {baseDir}/mcporter.json call maverick-linear.<tool> <arg>=<value> ...

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 50% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · mcporter.json (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.
json
"transport": "http", "auth": "refreshable_bearer", "refresh": { "tokenEndpoint": "https://api.linear.app/oauth/token", "clientIdEnv": "MAVERICK_LINEAR_MCP_CLIENT_ID", "clientSecretEnv": "MAVERICK_LINEAR_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET", "clientAuthMethod": "client_secret_basic"