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Security audit

Tavily Search

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Tavily web-search helper whose network and API-key use match its stated purpose.

Install only if you intend to use Tavily for web search and are comfortable sending search queries, domain filters, and your Tavily API key to Tavily's API. Do not use it for private, authenticated, or sensitive queries.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Tainted flow: 'request' from os.environ.get (line 175, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
def _request_json(request, timeout):
    def attempt(context):
        try:
            with urllib.request.urlopen(
                request, timeout=timeout, context=context
            ) as response:
                body = _read_bounded(response)
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
The skill requires access to an environment variable containing an API key and outbound network access, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates an authorization gap: a host may expose broader capabilities than intended, making it harder to enforce least privilege and easier for a modified or reused skill to access sensitive resources beyond simple web search.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
import urllib.error
import urllib.request

TAVILY_URL = "https://api.tavily.com/search"
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
USER_AGENT = "tavily-search-agent-skill/0.2.1"
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
This code sends the user-provided query and optional filtering data to a third-party service over the network, which can expose user input outside the local system. There is no confirmation prompt or user-facing disclosure at the point of transmission, and the operation is not self-disclosed in output messaging.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.