T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:27
- Finding
- Trello credentials exposed in command-line URL arguments<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 27, 32, 37, 42-45, 49-50, 55-56, 61-62, 78, and 82 **Vulnerability Type**: Credentials exposed through process command-line arguments **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash # Line 27 curl -s "https://api.trello.com/1/members/me/boards?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN" | jq '.[] | {name, id}' # Line 32 curl -s "https://api.trello.com/1/boards/{boardId}/lists?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN" | jq '.[] | {name, id}' # Line 37 curl -s "https://api.trello.com/1/lists/{listId}/cards?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN" | jq '.[] | {name, id, desc}' # Lines 42-45 curl -s -X POST "https://api.trello.com/1/cards?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN" \ -d "idList={listId}" \ -d "name=Card Title" \ -d "desc=Card description" # Lines 49-50 curl -s -X PUT "https://api.trello.com/1/cards/{cardId}?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN" \ -d "idList={newListId}" # Lines 55-56 curl -s -X POST "https://api.trello.com/1/cards/{cardId}/actions/comments?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN" \ -d "text=Your comment here" # Lines 61-62 curl -s -X PUT "https://api.trello.com/1/cards/{cardId}?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN" \ -d "closed=true" # Line 78 curl -s "https://api.trello.com/1/members/me/boards?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN&fields=name,id" | jq # Line 82 curl -s "https://api.trello.com/1/members/me/boards?key=$TRELLO_API_KEY&token=$TRELLO_TOKEN" | jq '.[] | select(.name | contains("Work"))' ``` ### Technical Analysis Every documented API request places `TRELLO_API_KEY` and `TRELLO_TOKEN` in the request URL passed to `curl`. The shell expands these environment variables before starting the process, so the resulting secrets become part of curl's command-line argument vector. Depending on the operating system and execution environment, command arguments may be available through process inspection interfaces, monitoring agents, a ...[truncated 2063 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Do not place API credentials directly in command-line URL arguments. 2. Use a client or protected curl configuration that obtains credentials from a permission-restricted file or another secret-delivery mechanism without exposing them in the process argument vector. 3. If a curl configuration file is used, create it with owner-only permissions such as `0600`, avoid committing it to source control, and remove temporary copies securely. 4. Prefer a dedicated credential helper or secret manager when the execution environment supports one. 5. Ensure command tracing, verbose HTTP logging, and request URL telemetry redact `key` and `token` query parameters. 6. Run the integration under a dedicated Trello identity and issue the narrowest practical token rather than using a broadly privileged personal account. 7. Rotate any credentials that may already have appeared in process-monitoring or audit logs, and review Trello activity for unauthorized API requests. 8. Add explicit documentation warning users not to paste expanded credential-bearing URLs into terminals, tickets, chat messages, or diagnostic reports. ]]>