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Security audit

google-sheets

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill provides disclosed Google Sheets workflows through AgentPMT, with expected risks from editing, sharing, paid calls, and remote storage.

Limit connected account access and spending. Specify exact spreadsheets, deletion targets, and sharing recipients, and keep backups. AgentPMT processes requests and stores exports. Review the separate credential-setup skills and future updates before using them; their installation sources are unpinned.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (10)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Account setup could support AgentPMT-hosted Sheets tools, but the supplied code consists entirely of installing other skills and provides no Sheets-specific implementation or invocation. Its observable purpose is skill installation and onboarding, materially different from the advertised spreadsheet operations. The behavior of the installed skills cannot be determined from this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The related-skill installation command uses an unpinned npx skills executable and an unpinned skill repository reference. Although this is an installer rather than an MCP server, following the instruction could execute a compromised package version or install changed agent instructions; no actual compromise is demonstrated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The onboarding installation example invokes an unversioned npm executable and retrieves skill content without an immutable revision. The setup context makes installation relevant, but it does not prevent upstream changes from introducing executable code or malicious agent instructions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The account-setup installation command leaves both the installer version and downloaded skill revision unpinned. This is particularly sensitive because the installed instructions concern account connectivity and credentials, although the supplied file does not demonstrate credential theft.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The installation script repeats the unpinned onboarding command, exposing users who run it to mutable npm and repository content. This is the same supply-chain weakness as the earlier onboarding example, not a separate exploit mechanism.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script installs the account/API setup skill through an unpinned executable and mutable repository reference. A compromised upstream dependency could influence subsequent account configuration or execute code through the installer; this repeats the earlier account-setup risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The reference section again recommends installing the onboarding skill with an unpinned npx command and repository revision. Its placement in documentation reduces immediacy but does not remove the supply-chain risk if an agent or user follows it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The account-setup reference repeats an installation path whose executable and skill content can change independently of this file. Because the downloaded skill guides authentication setup, unauthorized upstream changes could affect a sensitive workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 629)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/google-sheets-api
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 630)May include surrounding context.

md
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/google-sheets-api
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase