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Security audit

google-drive

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill coherently documents Google Drive management through AgentPMT, with disclosed file transfers, sharing, deletion, and setup dependencies.

Connect only a Google account whose files you intend the agent to manage, and check shared-drive access and usage charges. Downloaded content passes through AgentPMT storage. Explicitly authorize permanent deletion and public sharing. Review setup skills and updates before enabling them; unpinned installation commands can retrieve changed content.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (11)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The supplied code's sole behavior is adding two general AgentPMT skills. Although account setup could support a Drive workflow, this chunk contains no Drive-specific implementation or invocation connecting that setup to the declared purpose. The mismatch concerns the chunk's materially different primary behavior; the contents and behavior of the installed skills are not shown.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The recommended npx skills add command does not pin either the npm installer version or the source repository revision. Although this is a skill installer rather than an MCP server, following the recommendation could execute a compromised installer or import subsequently altered agent instructions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This setup recommendation uses an unversioned npm executable and a mutable skill repository reference. Installation is conditional rather than automatic, which reduces immediate exposure, but following it introduces a supply-chain trust boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The account-setup installation command leaves both the installer and downloaded instructions unpinned. Altered setup instructions could influence credential handling or connection configuration, making this dependency more sensitive than an informational skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The executable installation example runs npx skills without an exact version and retrieves skill content without an immutable revision. A compromised release or repository update could therefore change what executes locally or what instructions the agent later follows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This command installs account/API setup instructions through an unpinned npm installer and mutable repository source. Compromise of either dependency could introduce local code execution or malicious credential-setup guidance, although no compromise is demonstrated here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The reference repeats an installation command whose executable version and skill source revision are not fixed. Its placement in reference documentation lowers the likelihood of execution but does not remove the supply-chain exposure if followed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This reference repeats the unpinned installation route for the credential-related setup skill. The risk is dependency substitution or compromise, not evidence of malicious behavior in the supplied document.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 535)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/google-drive
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 536)May include surrounding context.

md
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/google-drive
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

Activation keywords include generic phrases unrelated to Google Drive.

Low
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The explicit activation keywords include "copy file", "file id", and "new name", which commonly occur in local filesystem tasks and other services. Although the surrounding text describes Google Drive, these keywords are not explicitly conditioned on a Google Drive context and could cause unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.